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Abstract. Adversarial attacks and the development of (deep) neural
networks robust against them are currently two widely researched topics.
The robustness of Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ) models against
adversarial attacks has however not yet been studied to the same ex-
tent. We therefore present an extensive evaluation of three LVQ mod-
els: Generalized LVQ, Generalized Matrix LVQ and Generalized Tangent
LVQ. The evaluation suggests that both Generalized LVQ and General-
ized Tangent LVQ have a high base robustness, on par with the cur-
rent state-of-the-art in robust neural network methods. In contrast to
this, Generalized Matrix LVQ shows a high susceptibility to adversarial
attacks, scoring consistently behind all other models. Additionally, our
numerical evaluation indicates that increasing the number of prototypes
per class improves the robustness of the models.
1 Introduction
The robustness against adversarial attacks of (deep) neural networks (NNs) for
classification tasks has become one of the most discussed topics in machine
learning research since it was discovered [1,2]. By making almost imperceptible
changes to the input of a NN, attackers are able to force a misclassification of the
input or even switch the prediction to any desired class. With machine learning
taking a more important role within our society, the security of machine learning
models in general is under more scrutiny than ever.
To define an adversarial example, we use a definition similar to [3]. Sup-
pose we use a set of scoring functions fj : X →R which assign a score to each
class j ∈ C = {1, . . . , Nc} given an input x of the data space X . Moreover,
the predicted class label c∗ (x) for x is determined by a winner-takes-all rule
c∗ (x) = argmaxj fj (x) and we have access to a labeled data point (x, y) which
is correctly classified as c∗ (x) = y. An adversarial example x˜ of the sample x
is defined as the minimal required perturbation of x by  to find a point at the
decision boundary or in the classification region of a different class than y, i. e.
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min

‖‖ , s.t. fj (x˜) ≥ fy (x˜) and x˜ = x+  ∈ X and j 6= y. (1)
Note that the magnitude of the perturbation is measured regarding a respective
norm ‖·‖. If fj (x˜) ≈ fy (x˜), an adversarial example close to the decision bound-
ary is found. Thus, adversarials are also related to the analysis of the decision
boundaries in a learned model. It is important to define the difference between
the ability to generalize and the robustness of a model [4]. Assume a model
trained on a finite number of data points drawn from an unknown data mani-
fold in X . Generalization refers to the property to correctly classify an arbitrary
point from the unknown data manifold (so-called on-manifold samples). The ro-
bustness of a model refers to the ability to correctly classify on-manifold samples
that were arbitrarily disturbed, e. g. by injecting Gaussian noise. Depending on
the kind of noise these samples are on-manifold or off-manifold adversarials (not
located on the data manifold). Generalization and robustness have to be learned
explicitly because the one does not imply the other.
Although Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ), as originally suggested by
T. Kohonen in [5], is frequently claimed as one of the most robust crisp classi-
fication approaches, its robustness has not been actively studied yet. This claim
is based on the characteristics of LVQ methods to partition the data space into
Vorono? cells (receptive fields), according to the best matching prototype vec-
tor. For the Generalized LVQ (GLVQ) [6], considered as a differentiable cost
function based variant of LVQ, robustness is theoretically anticipated because
it maximizes the hypothesis margin in the input space [7]. This changes if the
squared Euclidean distance in GLVQ is replaced by adaptive dissimilarity mea-
sures such as in Generalized Matrix LVQ (GMLVQ) [8] or Generalized Tangent
LVQ (GTLVQ) [9]. They first apply a projection and measure the dissimilarity
in the corresponding projection space, also denoted as feature space. A general
robustness assumption for these models seems to be more vague.
The observations of this paper are: (1) GLVQ and GTLVQ have a high
robustness because of their hypothesis margin maximization in an appropriate
space. (2) GMLVQ is susceptible to adversarial attacks and hypothesis margin
maximization does not guarantee a robust model in general. (3) By increasing
the number of prototypes the robustness and the generalization ability of a LVQ
model increases. (4) Adversarial examples generated for GLVQ and GTLVQ
often make semantic sense by interpolating between digits.
2 Learning Vector Quantization
LVQ assumes a set W = {w1, . . . ,wNw} of prototypes wk ∈ Rn to represent
and classify the data x ∈ X ⊆ Rn regarding a chosen dissimilarity d (x,wk).
Each prototype is responsible for exactly one class c (wk) ∈ C and each class is
represented by at least one prototype. The training dataset is defined as a set of
labeled data points X = {(xi, yi) |xi ∈ X , yi ∈ C}. The scoring function for the
class j yields fj (x) = −mink:c(wk)=j d (x,wk). Hence, the predicted class c∗ (x)
is the class label c (wk) of the closest prototype wk to x.
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Generalized LVQ: GLVQ is a cost function based variant of LVQ such that
stochastic gradient descent learning (SGDL) can be performed as optimiza-
tion strategy [6]. Given a training sample (xi, yi) ∈ X, the two closest pro-
totypes w+ ∈ W and w− ∈ W with correct label c (w+) = yi and incorrect
label c (w−) 6= yi are determined. The dissimilarity function is defined as the
squared Euclidean distance d2E (x,wk) = (x−wk)T (x−wk). The cost function
of GLVQ is
EGLVQ (X,W) =
∑
(xi,yi)∈X
l (xi, yi,W) (2)
with the local loss l (xi, yi,W) = ϕ (µ (xi, yi,W)) where ϕ is a monotonically
increasing differentiable activation function. The classifier function µ is defined
as
µ (xi, yi,W) = d
+ (xi)− d− (xi)
d+ (xi) + d− (xi)
∈ [−1, 1] (3)
where d± (xi) = d2E (xi,w±). Thus, µ (xi, yi,W) is negative for a correctly clas-
sified training sample (xi, yi) and positive otherwise. Since l (xi, yi,W) is differ-
entiable, the prototypes W can be learned by a SGDL approach.
Generalized Matrix LVQ: By substituting the dissimilarity measure d2E in
GLVQ with an adaptive dissimilarity measure
d2Ω (x,wk) = d2E (Ωx,Ωwk) , (4)
GMLVQ is obtained [8]. The relevance matrix Ω ∈ Rr×n is learned during
training in parallel to the prototypes. The parameter r controls the projection
dimension of Ω and must be defined in advance.
Generalized Tangent LVQ: In contrast to the previous methods, GTLVQ [9]
defines the prototypes as affine subspaces in Rn instead of points. More precisely,
the set of prototypes is defined as WT = {(w1,W1) , . . . , (wNw ,WNw)} where
Wk ∈ Rn×r is the r-dimensional basis and wk is the translation vector of the
affine subspace. Together with the parameter vector θ ∈ Rr, they form the
prototype as affine subspace wk +Wkθ. The tangent distance is defined as
d2T (x, (wk,Wk)) = min
θ∈Rr
d2E (x,wk +Wkθ) (5)
where r is a hyperparameter. Substituting d2E in GLVQ with d2T and redefining
the set of prototypes to WT yields GTLVQ. The affine subspaces defined by
(wk,Wk) are learned by SGDL.
3 Experimental Setup
In this section adversarial attacks as well as robustness metrics are introduced
and the setup of the evaluation is explained. The setup used here follows the one
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presented in [10] with a few minor modifications to the study of LVQ methods.
All experiments and models were implemented using the Keras framework in
Python on top of Tensorflow.4 All evaluated LVQ models are made available
as pretrained Tensorflow graphs and as part of the Foolbox zoo5 at https:
//github.com/LarsHoldijk/robust_LVQ_models.
The Foolbox [11] implementations with default settings were used for the
attacks. The evaluation was performed using the MNIST dataset as it is one of
the most used datasets for robust model evaluation in the literature. Despite
being considered by many as a solved ‘toy’ dataset with state-of-the-art (SOTA)
deep learning models reaching close to perfect classification accuracy, the defense
of adversarial attacks on MNIST is still far from being trivial [10]. The dataset
consists of handwritten digits in the data space X = [0, 1]n with n = 28 · 28. We
trained our models on the 60K training images and evaluated all metrics and
scores on the complete 10K test images.
3.1 Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks can be grouped into two different approaches, white-box and
black-box, distinguished by the amount of knowledge about the model available
to the attacker. White-box or gradient-based attacks are based on exploiting the
interior gradients of the NNs, while black-box attacks rely only on the output
of the model, either the logits, the probabilities or just the predicted discrete
class labels. Each attack is designed to optimize the adversarial image regarding
a given norm. Usually, the attacks are defined to optimize over Lp norms (or
p-norms) with p ∈ {0, 2,∞} and, therefore, are called Lp-attacks.
In the evaluation, nine attacks including white-box and black-box attacks
were compared. The white-box attacks are: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
[1], Fast Gradient Method (FGM), Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [12], Momen-
tum Iterative Method (MIM) [13] and Deepfool [14]. The black-box attacks are:
Gaussian blur, Salt-and-Pepper (S&P), Pointwise [10] and Boundary [15]. See
Tab. 1 for the Lp definition of each attack. Note that some of the attacks are
defined for more than one norm.
3.2 Robustness Metrics
The robustness of a model is measured by four different metrics, all based on
the adversarial distances δA (x, y). Given a labeled test sample (x, y) from a test
set T and an adversarial Lp-attack A, δA (x, y) is defined as: (1) zero if the data
sample is misclassified c∗ (x) 6= y; (2) ‖‖p = ‖x˜− x‖p if A found an adversary
x˜ and c∗ (x) = y; (3) ∞ if no adversary was found by A and c∗ (x) = y.
For each attack A the median-δA score is defined as
median {δA (x, y) | (x, y) ∈ T} , describing an averaged δA over T ro-
bust to outliers.6 The median-δ∗p score is computed for all Lp-attacks
4 Tensorflow: www.tensorflow.org; Keras: www.keras.io
5 https://foolbox.readthedocs.io/en/latest/modules/zoo.html
6 Hence, median-δA can be ∞ if for over 50% of the samples no adversary was found.
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Table 1. The results of the robustness evaluation. Attacks are clustered by their Lp
class, the boxes denote the type of the attack (white- or black-box). Accuracies are given
in percentages and the #prototypes is recorded per class. All scores are evaluated on
the test set. For each model we report the clean accuracy (clean acc.), the median-δA
(left value) and acc-A score (right value) for each attack and the worst-case (worst-c.)
analysis over all Lp-attacks by presenting the median-δ∗p (left value) and acc-A∗p score
(right value). Higher scores mean higher robustness of the model. The median-δA of
the most robust model in each attack is highlighted in bold. Overall, the model with
the best (highest) worst-case median-δ∗p is underlined and highlighted.
CNN Madry GLVQ GMLVQ GTLVQ
#prototypes 1 128 1 49 1 10
Clean acc. 99 99 83 95 88 93 95 97
L
2
FGM  2.1 73 ∞ 96 ∞ 63 ∞ 76 0.6 7 0.8 15 ∞ 71 ∞ 81
Deepfool  1.9 70 5.5 94 1.6 53 2.3 73 0.5 26 0.7 27 2.3 73 2.5 81
BIM  1.5 50 4.9 94 1.5 50 2.1 68 0.6 6 0.7 8 2.1 68 2.3 77
Gaussian  6.4 99 6.6 98 6.8 83 6.7 68 6.3 88 6.2 92 7.1 94 6.9 97
Pointwise  4.2 96 2.1 80 4.5 79 5.4 92 1.6 54 2.4 78 5.5 92 5.6 95
Boundary  1.9 76 1.5 52 2.1 61 3.2 76 0.6 7 0.8 7 2.8 78 3.1 86
worst-c. 1.5 50 1.5 52 1.5 49 2.1 68 0.5 3 0.6 3 2.1 68 2.2 77
L
∞
FGSM  .17 7 .52 96 .17 11 .29 43 .04 0 .05 0 .22 18 .25 26
Deepfool  .16 1 .49 95 .13 7 .22 21 .04 27 .05 19 .19 9 .22 19
BIM  .12 0 .41 94 .12 3 .20 9 .04 0 .05 0 .17 3 .20 5
MIM  .13 0 .38 93 .12 3 .19 9 .04 0 .05 0 .17 3 .20 5
worst-c. .12 0 .38 93 .11 2 .19 5 .03 0 .04 0 .17 3 .19 4
L
0
Pointwise  19 73 4 1 22 64 32 79 3 6 6 18 34 80 35 85
S&P  65 94 17 63 126 77 188 92 8 37 17 61 155 91 179 95
worst-c. 19 73 4 1 22 64 32 79 3 6 6 18 34 80 35 85
as the median
{
δ∗p (x, y) | (x, y) ∈ T
}
where δ∗p (x, y) is defined as
min {δA (x, y) |A is a Lp-attack}. This score is a worst-case evaluation of
the median-δA, assuming that each sample is disturbed by the respective
worst-case attack A∗p (the attack with the smallest distance). Additionally,
the threshold accuracies acc-A and acc-A∗p of a model over T are defined as
the percentage of adversarial examples found with δA (x, y) ≤ tp, using either
the given Lp-attack A for all samples or the respective worst-case attack A∗p
respectively. This metric represents the remaining accuracy of the model when
only adversaries under a given threshold are considered valid. We used the
following thresholds for our evaluation: t0 = 12, t2 = 1.5 and t∞ = 0.3.
3.3 Training Setup and Models
All models, except the Madry model, were trained with the Adam optimizer [16]
for 150 epochs using basic data augmentation in the form of random shifts by
±2 pixels and random rotations by ±15◦ .
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NN Models: Two NNs are used as baseline models for the evaluation. The first
model is a convolutional NN, denoted as CNN, with two convolutional layers and
two fully connected layers. The convolutional layers have 32 and 64 filters with
a stride of one and a kernel size of 3×3. Both are followed by max-pooling layers
with a window size and stride each of 2×2. None of the layers use padding. The
first fully connected layer has 128 neurons and a dropout rate of 0.5. All layers
use the ReLU activation function except for the final fully connected output layer
which uses a softmax function. The network was trained using the categorical
cross entropy loss and an initial learning rate of 10−4 with a decay of 0.9 at
plateaus.
The second baseline model is the current SOTA model for MNIST in terms
of robustness proposed in [17] and denoted as Madry. This model relies on a
special kind of adversarial training by considering it as a min-max optimization
game: before the loss function is minimized over a given training batch, the
original images are partially substituted by perturbed images with ‖‖∞ ≤ 0.3
such that the loss function is maximized over the given batch. The Madry model
was downloaded from https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge.
LVQ Models: All three LVQ models were trained using an initial learning rate
of 0.01 with a decay of 0.5 at plateaus and with ϕ defined as the identity function.
The prototypes (translation vectors) of all methods were class-wise initialized by
k-means over the training dataset. For GMLVQ, we defined Ω with n = r and
initialized Ω as a scaled identity matrix with Frobenius norm one. After each
update step, Ω was normalized to again have Frobenius norm one. The basis
matrices Wk of GTLVQ were defined by r = 12 and initialized by a singular
value decomposition with respect to each initialized prototype wk over the set of
class corresponding training points [9]. The prototypes were not constrained to
X (‘box constrained’) during the training, resulting in possibly non-interpretable
prototypes as they can be points in Rn.7
Two versions of each LVQ model were trained: one with one prototype per
class and one with multiple prototypes per class. For the latter the numbers of
prototypes were chosen such that all LVQ models have roughly 1M parameters.
The chosen number of prototypes per class are given in Tab. 1 by #prototypes.
4 Results
The results of the model robustness evaluation are presented in Tab. 1. Fig. 1
displays adversarial examples generated for each model. Below, the four most
notable observations that can be made from the results are discussed.
Hypothesis margin maximization in the input space produces robust
models (GLVQ and GTLVQ are highly robust): Tab. 1 shows outstand-
ing robustness against adversarial attacks for GLVQ and GTLVQ. GLVQ with
7 A restriction to X leads to an accuracy decrease of less than 1%.
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CNN
Madry
GLVQ
GMLVQ
GTLVQ
Fig. 1. For each model, adversarial examples generated by the attacks (from left to
right): Gaussian, Deepfool (L2), BIM (L2), Boundary, Pointwise (L0), S&P, FGSM,
Deepfool (L∞), BIM (L∞) and MIM. For the LVQ models the version with more pro-
totypes per class was used. The ten digits were randomly selected under the condition
that every digit was classified correctly by all models. The original images are 0, 1,
..., 9 from left to right. The red digits in the lower right corners indicate the models
prediction after the adversarial attack.
multiple prototypes and GTLVQ with both one or more prototypes per class,
outperform the NN models by a large difference for the L0- and L2-attacks while
having a considerably lower clean accuracy. This is not only the case for individ-
ual black-box attacks but also for the worst-case scenarios. For the L0-attacks
this difference is especially apparent. A possible explanation is that the robust-
ness of GLVQ and GTLVQ is achieved due to the input space hypothesis margin
maximization [7].8 In [7] it was stated that the hypothesis margin is a lower
bound for the sample margin which is, if defined in the input space, used in
the definition of adversarial examples (1). Hence, if we maximize the hypothesis
margin in the input space we guarantee a high sample margin and therefore, a
robust model. A first attempt to transfer this principle was made in [3] to create
a robust NN by a first order approximation of the sample margin in the input
space.
However, the Madry model still outperforms GLVQ and GTLVQ in the L∞-
attacks as expected. This result is easily explained using the manifold based
definition of adversarial examples and the adversarial training procedure of the
Madry model, which optimizes the robustness against ‖‖∞ ≤ 0.3. Consider-
ing the manifold definition, one could say that Madry augmented the original
MNIST manifold to include small L∞ perturbations. Doing so, Madry creates
a new training-manifold in addition to the original MNIST manifold. In other
words, the L∞ robustness of the adversarial trained Madry model can be seen
8 Note that the results of [7] hold for GTLVQ as it can be seen as a version of GLVQ
with infinitely many prototypes learning the affine subspaces.
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as its generalization on the new training-manifold (this becomes clear if one
considers the high acc-A scores for L∞). For this reason, the Madry model is
only robust against off-manifold examples that are on the generated training-
manifold. As soon as off-training-manifold examples are considered the accuracy
will drop fast. This was also shown in [10], where the accuracy of the Madry
model is significantly lower when considering a threshold t∞ > 0.3.9
Furthermore, the Madry model has outstanding robustness scores for
gradient-based attacks in general. We accredit this effect to potential obfus-
cation of gradients as a side-effect of the adversarial training procedure. While
[18] was not able to find concrete evidence of gradient obfuscation due to adver-
sarial training in the Madry model, it did list black-box-attacks outperforming
white-box attacks as a signal for its occurrence.
Hypothesis margin maximization in a space different to the input
space does not necessarily produce robust models (GMLVQ is suscep-
tible for adversarial attacks): In contrast to GLVQ and GTLVQ, GMLVQ
has the lowest robustness score across all attacks and all methods. Taking the
strong relation of GTLVQ and GMLVQ into account [9], it is a remarkable re-
sult.10 One potential reason is, that GMLVQ maximizes the hypothesis margin
in a projection space which differ in general from the input space. The margin
maximization in the projection space is used to construct a model with good gen-
eralization abilities, which is why GMLVQ usually outperforms GLVQ in terms
of accuracy (see the clean accuracy for GLVQ and GMLVQ with one prototype
per class). However, a large margin in the projection space does not guarantee a
big margin in the input space. Thus, GMLVQ does not implicitly optimize the
separation margin, as used in the definition of an adversarial example (1), in the
input space. Hence, GMLVQ is a good example to show that a model, which
generalizes well, is not necessarily robust.
Another effect which describes the observed lack of robustness by GMLVQ
is its tendency to oversimplify (to collapse data dimensions) without regulariza-
tion. Oversimplification may induce heavy distortions in the mapping between
input and projection space, potentially creating dimensions in which a small
perturbation in the input space can be mapped to a large perturbation in the
9 For future work a more extensive evaluation should be considered: including not
only the norm for which a single attack was optimized but rather a combination
of all three norms. This gives a better insight on the characteristics of the attack
and the defending model. The L0 norm can be interpreted as the number of pixels
that have to change, the L∞ norm as the maximum deviation of a pixel and the
L2 norm as a kind of average pixel change. As attacks are optimized for a certain
norm, only considering this norm might give a skewed impression of their attacking
capability. Continuing, calculating a threshold accuracy including only adversaries
that are below all three thresholds may give an interesting and more meaningful
metric.
10 GTLVQ can be seen as localized version of GMLVQ with the constraint that the Ω
matrices must be orthogonal projectors.
Robustness of GLVQ models against adversarial attacks 9
projection space. These dimensions are later used to efficiently place the adver-
sarial attack. This effect is closely related to theory known from metric learning,
here oversimplification was used by [19] to optimize a classifier over d2Ω, which
maximally collapses (concentrates) the classes to single points (related to the
prototypes in GMLVQ). It is empirically shown that this effect helps to achieve
a good generalization.
To improve the robustness of GMLVQ penalizing the collapsing of dimensions
may be a successful approach. A method to achieve this is to force the eigenvalue
spectrum of the mapping to follow a uniform distribution, as proposed in [20].
This regularization technique would also strengthen the transferability between
the margin in the projection and input space. Unfortunately, it requires the
possibly numerical instable computation of the derivative of a determinant of a
product ofΩ which makes it impossible to train an appropriate model for MNIST
using this regularization so far. The fact that GTLVQ is a constrained version
of GMLVQ gives additional reason to believe that regularizations / constraints
are able to force a model to be more robust.
Increasing the number of prototypes improves the ability to generalize
and the robustness: For all three LVQ models the robustness improves if the
number of prototypes per class increases. Additionally, increasing the number
of prototypes leads to a better ability to generalize. This observation provides
empirical evidence supporting the results of [4]. In [4] it was stated that gener-
alization and robustness are not necessarily contradicting goals, which is a topic
recently under discussion.
With multiple prototypes per class, the robustness of the GLVQ model im-
proves by a significantly larger margin than GTLVQ. This can be explained by
the high accuracy of GTLVQ with one prototype. The high accuracy with one
prototype per class indicates that the data manifold of MNIST is almost flat
and can therefore be described with one tangent such that introducing more
prototypes does not improve the model’s generalization ability. If we add more
prototypes in GLVQ, the prototypes will start to approximate the data manifold
and with that implicitly the tangent prototypes used in GTLVQ. With more pro-
totypes per class, the scores of GLVQ will therefore most likely converge towards
those of GTLVQ.
GLVQ and GTLVQ require semantically correct adversarial examples:
Fig. 1 shows a large semantic difference between the adversarial examples gener-
ated for GLVQ/GTLVQ and the other models. A large portion of the adversarial
examples generated for the GLVQ and GTLVQ models look like interpolations
between the original digit and another digit.11 This effect is especially visible
for the Deepfool, BIM and Boundary attacks. In addition to this, the Pointwise
attack is required to generate features from other digits to fool the models, e. g.
the horizontal bar of a two in the case of GLVQ and the closed ring of a nine
11 A similar effect was observed in [10] for k-NN models.
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for GTLVQ (see digit four). In other words, for GLVQ and GTLVQ some of
the attacks generate adversaries that closer resemble on-manifold samples than
off-manifold. For the other models, the adversaries are more like off-manifold
samples (or in the case of Madry, off-training-manifold).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we extensively evaluated the robustness of LVQ models against ad-
versarial attacks. Most notably, we have shown that there is a large difference in
the robustness of the different LVQ models, even if they all perform a hypothesis
margin maximization. GLVQ and GTLVQ show high robustness against adver-
sarial attacks, while GMLVQ scores the lowest across all attacks and all models.
The discussion related to this observation has lead to four important conclu-
sions: (1) For (hypothesis) margin maximization to lead to robust models the
space in which the margin is maximized matters, this must be the same space
as where the attack is placed. (2) Collapsed dimensions are beneficial for the
generalization ability of a model. However, they can be harmful for the model’s
robustness. (3) It is possible to derive a robust model by applying a fitting reg-
ularization / constraint. This can be seen in the relation between GTLVQ and
GMLVQ and is also studied for NNs [21]. (4) Our experimental results with
an increased number of prototypes support the claim of [4], that the ability to
generalize and the robustness are principally not contradicting goals.
In summary, the overall robustness of LVQ models is impressive. Using
only one prototype per class and no purposefully designed adversarial train-
ing, GTLVQ is on par with SOTA robustness on MNIST. With further research,
the robustness of LVQ models against adversarial attacks can be a valid reason
to deploy them instead of NNs in security critical applications.
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